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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLEO R, POWELL, * 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DICK Et BASTIAN; DEE * C a S e n ° ' 
V, SHARP, dba SHARP 13939 
REALTY and PROVO 
BRANCH PRUDENTIAL 
FEDERAL SAVINGS and * 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
Federally Chartered 
Savings and Loan ^ 
Association, 
Respondents. ^ 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT . 
Dee V. Sharp 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action for damages 
in connection with the sale of a house by 
the appellant to the defendant Bastian 
with an option to repurchase. It is basi-
cally a dispute as to the disposition of 
the proceeds of the second sale of the 
same house to a third party named 
Ethington. This respondent was involved 
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only in a correlary issue as to whether 
the appellant was liable for fees to the 
realtor who located the second purchasor. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
• » ' • . . . . . . . 
- IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried in the 
District Court without a jury, and on the 
issue involving this Respondent, the Court 
found that there was a fiduciary relation-
ship between the realtor and the Seller of 
the property, but that that relationship 
did not require the realtor to adjudicate 
a dispute between the appellant and the 
respondent Bastian, who was the first pur-
chasor of the house. 
'• FACTS OF THE CASE 
In June of 1970, the Appellant 
owned a home in Orem, Utah, which was en-
cumbered by a first mortgage at Walker 
Bank and Trust Company, a second mortgage 
at Lockhart Company, in addition to which 
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the^e was a judgment in favor of Provo 
Adjustment Service and a warrant for del-
inquent taxes in favor of the State Tax 
Commission, 
The holder of the second 
mortgage threatened to foreclose because 
of delinquent installments owned by the 
appellant, and in order to avoid this 
calamity, the Plaintiff approached the 
Respondent Bastian and ultimately sold him 
the property for the $16,000,00. taking 
back an option to repurchase within three 
months for $18,000.00, plus interest. She 
deeded the property to Bastian who paid 
off the second mortgage and assumed the 
first mortgage; Bastian also paid off the 
judgment and the tax lien and paid to 
Appellant the balance of $3,055,34, 
After attempting unsuccess-
fully to sell the home privately, the 
appellant listed the property for sale 
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with Boley Realty Company who registered 
it on the Multiple Listing Service in Utah 
County. j 
Respondent Sharp, a broker who 
is also connected with the Multiple Listing 
Service, located a buyer named Ethington 
and he prepared on behalf of the Ethingtons 
an earnest money offer which he presented to 
Mrs, Powell, After accepting the offer and 
signing the earnest money agreement, Mrs. 
Powell informed Sharp that she had sold the 
property to Bastian and that Sharp would 
have to obtain Bastian1s signature on the 
earnest money; she did not disclose the fact 
that she had an option to repurchase the 
property, 
Mr. Sharp arranged for 
Ethingtons to finance the purchase of their 
new home through Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan and attended the loan closing with 
his clients, the Ethingtons. 
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Mr, Sharp approved the closing 
statements insofar as they applied to the 
Ethingtons, he was not aware of any dispute 
between Mrs, Powell and Mr. Bastian until 
some months later when Mrs. Powell took out 
bankruptcy and Sharp received a series of 
letters from an attorney actiingon behalf 
of Mrs. Powell. (See Stewart-Sharp letters, 
Exhibits f,AM, MB?\ and nCM.) 
The appellant's argument 
Points I, II, IV, V and VI, are addressed 
to the other respondents and no attempt 
will be made hereto respond to those points. 
The respondent Sharp will respond only to 
Point III of the appellant's brief. 
POINT I 
A REAL ESTATE BROKER IS 
ONLY REQUIRED TO ACT IN 
GOOD FAITH AND NOT AS A 
GUARANTOR. 
The appellant in her brief 
relies almost wholely on the case of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Reese ygV Harper, 8 Utah 2Cd) 119, 329 P, 
2(d) 410, in attempting to argue that the 
broker somehow violated his fiduciary duty 
to the appellant, On page 15 of the Appel-
lants brief, it is stated; 
"Mrs. Powell alleged in her 
verified complaint and the 
trial court found as fact 
(R-104) that defendant Sharp 
was employed by Mrs. Powell 
as her agent and the court 
found Sharp owed her a fid-
ciary duty. This finding 
places this aspect to this 
case on all fours with Reese 
vs.. Harper..," 
The actual finding of the Court 
was distinctly to the contrary. The Court's 
memorandum decision, Judge Bullock found 
in paragraph 2\ 
"2, Defendant Dee V. Sharp 
as a real estate broker, 
had a duty to the seller 
to whom he charged a com-
mission to apply his abili^ 
ties and knowledge to the 
advantage of the seller 
and make full disclosure 
to the seller, etc. as set 
forth in Reese vs. Harper, 
8 Utah 2(d) 119; nothwith-
standing the fact that the 
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sale? agency contract was 
with another real estate 
agent, However, this ob-
ligation pertains to the 
interests of the seller, 
as opposed to the interests 
of the buyer and except 
as to good faith require-
ments, it does not require 
the agent who has found a 
buyer for the property 
to represent one seller 
as against another seller, 
especially where there 
is nothing, as in this 
case, to put him on notice, 
that there is any conflict 
of interest between them. 
There is no evidence that 
Dee V. Sharp acted with-
out entire good faith.'1 
The case before the Court is 
easily distinguishable from the Reese vs. 
Harper case. In Reese vs. Harper, the 
broker had, in fact, listed the Seller's 
property for the sum of $45,000.00, he 
then located a buyer who offered to pay 
$30,000.00 for the property, There were 
outstanding mortgages and other obligations 
against the property amounting to approxi-
mately $15,000.00 and the seller of the 
property assumed that the new buyer was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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assuming the obligations outstanding 
against the property and that they would 
net $30,000,00. In fact they would net 
only approximately half that much because 
the sale to the purchasor did not include 
an assumption of the outstanding obligations, 
but anticipated the payment of all out-
standing obligations out of the purchase 
price of $30,000.00. The court quite . 
rightly held in the Reese vs. Harper case 
that the broker had failed to disclose the 
true facts to his client and therefore for-
feited any right he had to recover his 
broker1s fees. 
In the instant case the 
opposite is true, it is Mrs. Powell, who 
failed to disclose all of the facts known 
by her to the realtor, She alone knew the 
full facts of the transaction between her 
and Mr, Bastian and at no time did she 
ever disclose those facts to Mr, Sharp. 
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She simply told him thatt the property had 
been sold and in order for the second sale 
to take place to the Ethingtons, Mr. Sharp 
would have to get the earnest money assign-
ment signed by Bastian. In actual practice 
it is not at all unusual for the owner of 
the fee to sell on an unrecorded contract 
under which another person is the equitable 
owner, 
On page 16 of appellant's 
brief, appellant referrs to three separate 
grounds for her contention that Mr. Sharp 
failed to perform his duties, to-wit: 
(a). by failing to notify her of the time 
and place of the closing, (b). by failure 
to examine and approve the closing state-
ment and (c) by permitting unlawful 
charges against Mrs. Powellls equity. 
The trial court found on the 
facts, that Mrs. Powell had not disclosed 
to Mr. Sharp any reason to be concerned 
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on her behalf? he had simply located a 
buyer ready and willing and able to purv 
chase the property and he assumed that 
according to custom that Prudential Fed-
eral Savings and Loan, the loaning instit-
ution would conduct the closing meeting to 
be held in their offices and that his only 
responability would be to see that the 
accounts balanced as between E thing tons and 
the seller or sellers. 
The trial court correctly 
found that it is beyond the scope of Reese 
vs, Harper to require the Realtor to act 
as a mediator between two sellers. The 
court also correctly found: 
ffthere is not evidence that 
defendant Sharp acted with-
out entire good faith.-1 
In the case of Bunnell vs. 
Bills, 13 Utah 2(d) 83, 368 P. 2(d) 
599, at page 600, our court distinquished 
between that case and the Reese vs. Harper 
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case on the grounds that in the Bunnell ' 
case that was doubt as to the validity of 
the contention that the realtor was acting 
as the Plaintiff*s agent, when in fact he 
was agent for the other party. There can 
be no doubt that there is a different 
fiduciary duty and a more demanding one in 
a situation like Reese vs. Harper, than in 
the instant case, there was full disclosure 
of all the information that the realtor had 
to the seller. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND ON 
THE FACTS THAT UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, MR. SHARP 
HAD DISCHARGED HIS DUTY 
TO MRS. POWELL ffWITH 
REASONABLE DILIGENCE," 
The Reese vs, Harper case 
also been referred to by our Supreme Court 
in the case of Raspbury vs. Bainum, 15 Utah 
2(d) 62, 387 P, 2(d) 240, the court in 
resta ting the Reese vs. Harper, doctrine 
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refers to duty flowing from the fact that 
one party is in a pecular position to be 
familar with the fiduciary affairs of the 
other. It is evident from the record that 
no such relationship existed between Mrs. 
Powell and Mr. Sharp. Mr. Sharp was in 
fact, a representive of the Ethingtons, 
who were the ultimate purchasers of the 
property. He simply presented an earnest 
money offer to Mrs. Powell, who told him 
in terms he reasonably interpreted as 
disclaiming any further financial interest 
in the contract, that she had sold the 
property to Mr, Bastian and Mr. Sharp would 
have to look to the Bastians for a further 
signature, in order to effectuate the sale 
of the property to the Ethingtons, No 
communication was made to Mr, Sharp that 
would in any way place him on notice that 
there was a dispute between Powell and 
Bastian, 
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It is likewise it not unusual 
for a prior owner such as Mrs, Powell to 
still have a financial interest in the 
property when it is resold, so the fact 
that Bastian was shown as seller and that 
Mrs, Powell had a distribution from the 
closing would impose no duty on Mr. Sharp 
to protect her rights, when no such rights 
were made known to him. 
The appellant herein has 
elected not to rely on the trial transcript. 
In effect, this is then an appeal on the 
law only and the facts as found by the 
lower court should be accepted on appeal 
in the light most favorable to the Res*-
pondent, 
The lower court found Mr. 
Sharp to have performed his function in 
good faith, if Mrs. Powell has any com-
plaint, it is that Bastian owes her some 
money. If that is true, then she has a 
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full and complete remedy available at 
law and no stringent equitable remedy is 
applicable, 
Respectfully submitted this 
9th day of May, 1975. 
2£L J, ELLIS/y&ttorney 
or Respondent-Sharp 
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